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ABSTRACT 
CEO Compensation: A Question of Ethics. (April 2004) 
James Harrison Cole 
Department of Accounting 
Texas A8 M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Clair Nixon 
Department of Accounting 
The outrageous corporate accounting and fraud scandals in the past 
years have all but demolished investors' faith in our accounting framework. One 
big area of concern is executive compensation. In 1992, Congress enacted 
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which limited executive 
compensation that is deductible to one million dollars a year. As an alternative, 
stock option plans have gained popularity. The reporting for these plans is very 
controversial however, as different methods produce vastly different expenses, 
both in size and timing. Another concern of many investors is earnings 
management, the concept of tiining revenues and expenses in order to steady 
and inflate earnings. This has many implications within executive reporting as 
the method chosen can greatly affect compensation expense, both in size and 
consistency, and thus manage earnings. This paper will focus on both 
deontological and teleological ethical models in order to show the inherent 
inconsistencies contained within the intrinsic method of option reporting. The 
study also demonstrates ethical standards already existing within the accounting 
field which are irreconcilable with the intrinsic method of reporting. Both 
teleological and deontological models are used to demonstrate the current 
required method's shorffalls and prove the fair value method does not in fact 
violate the principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of right and wrong has plagued mankind for centudies. 
Sometimes a consensus is available but in many circumstances one is not. 
There are many circumstances where what is determined to be legal is viewed 
as wrong and vice versa. The distinction between legal and ethical is not always 
clear, as the numerous corporate accounting scandals that have rocked 
America's markets have recently demonstrated. Where the line is drawn has 
become increasingly murky and confused as mountains of FASB statements 
and Internal Revenue Code changes have dimmed what exactly is expected of 
the accounting profession. 
For this inquiry I will examine ethical models created and refined by some 
of history's greatest thinkers. Two ethical models, which are more applicable to 
business situations, are the deontological approach of German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, and the utilitarianism approach of John Stuart Mill. While each 
approaches ethics from a different starting point, both have strong points and 
holes in their arguments. For our purposes, they represent the polarities of 
ethical thinking, and will be examined more closely in conjunction with defined 
regulations. 
This thesis follows the style and format of The Journal of Business Ethics 
MORAL THEORIES 
Kant's theory relies heavily on the concept of duty in order to determine 
what is morally right. According to Robert Johnson, this position can be 
summarized in the following way, "the performance of a dutiful action is morally 
good only if it is no accident that its motive led to it" (Johnson, 1996). In other 
words, if one performs an action because it is their job, that action is only morally 
good if their motive was to perform the action because that action was their job. 
This has many implications in the accounting profession. The next question that 
naturally arises is what exactly is one's duty when preparing or auditing financial 
statements? Is it to follow Financial Accounting Standards Board standards to 
their precise letter or follow the spirit of the ruling? What about Federal Tax 
regulations? Should tax professionals seek to simply minimize the tax burden of 
an entity or should they seek to comply with the law? 
Utilitarianists, such as John Stuart Mill, have attempted to answer the 
ethical question by stating that in any given situation, the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people will be the morally right option. Under a utilitarian 
system, the greatest happiness or absence from pain is the greatest good. The 
natural progression is from a selfish point of view to a societal point of view 
(Boylan, 2000). Natural happiness then progresses to a greater good. "The 
utilitarian system is committed to the maximization of the good; for it asserts that 
we always ought to produce the greatest possible balance of value for all 
persons affected" (Beauchamp 4). Under this system, the probable 
consequences of an action must be considered before the choice is made. 
Naturally this seems to fall in line with the FASB's framework, as the effect on 
shareholders must be taken into account when preparing financial documents. 
The more information that can be supplied would seem to be better. But one 
criticism of this hedonistic approach is that there is no place to draw a line. We 
must sometimes sacrifice integrity in order to achieve the greater good. There is 
a distinction between quantity and quality of pleasure (Boylan, 2000). Again, a 
requirement consistent with this criticism is that financial statements be 
decipherable to persons with a reasonable understanding of business and 
economic activities (FASB, 1978). Yet another question, which can be raised, is 
that of the standard of good in the accounting world. Is it truth? That is does 
doing the most good involve most honestly representing the company? Or is it 
the bottom line? Does doing the most good involve maximizing the bottom line? 
Or maximizing the return to investors? Or does achieving the greater good 
involve following reporting regulations to the most precise letter? The questions 
we will seek to answer through an in depth analysis of federal regulations as well 
as through a survey of qualified CPA's. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In 1993, the Internal Revenue Service introduced a new law, Section 
162(M) of the Internal Revenue Code, which prohibited corporations from 
deducting CEO payments of greater than one million dollars. As a result, many 
companies have turned to other benefits, such as houses, cars, and most 
notably stock options. Stock Options are agreements that guarantee an 
employee the right to buy company stock at a predetermined price. They are 
not required however to make this purchase. This price is often far below the 
market price, which allows the option holder to make a sizable unrealized gain 
upon purchase. Once these agreements are granted the entity has several 
options when reporting their options. The first is known as the intrinsic value 
method. Under this method, which is required by the tax laws, a corporation 
calculates the compensation expense as the difference between the market 
value of the option at the grant date and the exercise value of the option at the 
grant date. The Internal Revenue Code requires these values to be equal. This 
method of reporting has been in place since APB No. 25. The APB not being 
the governing body, the FASB in 1993 tried to edit the reporting requirements to 
mandate the fair value reporting method. This method uses sophisticated option 
pricing models, which take into account the present and future values of a dollar, 
the likelihood the executive will exercise the option, and other factors to ardive at 
a fair market value of the option which is then recognized as compensation 
expense. The outcry from the corporate world was unprecedented, however, 
and Congress even threatened to intervene if the FASB went through with the 
proposal. The FASB then elected to make the fair value method optional but 
recommended. It has since required the effects of this method to be disclosed in 
pro forma in the income statement. The purpose of this inquiry is to argue for 
the fair value method of stock option reporting by answering the questions posed 
previously. The overall objective, towards which this endeavor will simply be a 
step, is to provide the American public with a trustworthy business system, 
within which the public can be certain ethical practices are being followed. 
METHODOLOGY 
Much musing has been done in the past by some of history's 
greatest thinkers as to the question of right and wrong. Additionally, scholars 
have commented on these models since their inception. For the purposes of 
this question, I will rely on original texts as well as commentaries. Several 
systems will be examined in detail, including the utilitarianism, a teleological 
approach and a code of ethics, or deontological approach. Many people, 
however, feel that philosophy is not a practical endeavor that can be applied to 
everyday life. As such, to find what is truly objectively ethical, we must not rely 
solely on reasoning. Two additional sources will be employed. The first will be 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board statements, which provide a 
framework for accounting by laying out its objectives, assumptions, principles, 
and constraints, as well as rules for specific situations, such as how to account 
for stock options. Second, empirical evidence will be used. Surveys will be sent 
out to practicing certified public accountants. Contacts made in the professional 
world will distribute the web-driven, anonymous survey to their peers. The 
survey will be distributed to approximately 350 potential respondents. These 
surveys will ask questions concerning an accountants' duty and the standard of 
measure for the greatest good. The purpose of the survey will be to establish 
motives and mores which I believe already exist in order to prove the intrinsic 
value method unethical. The respondents were presented with the following 
options and asked to rank the appropriateness of each on a one to seven scale 
with one being "Not Acceptable" and seven being "Expected. " 
1) Report items Pro Forma which are material in nature 
2) Withhold information to increase one's own compensation through 
stock option plans 
3) Report information as if the executive were a shareholder 
4) Report items Pro Forma in order to maximize the bottom line 
5) Disclose information to increase one's own compensation through 
stock option plans 
6) Subtly modify information to increase stock price 
7) Follow accepted but not recommended guidelines to increase net 
income 
8) Report items Pro Forma in order to satisfy fair bargaining 
conditions 
Answers will then be analyzed in order to determine any correlation 
between key linked questions and hopefully establish ethical norms within the 
profession. 
RESULTS 
The surveys were distributed to approximately 325 potential respondents, 
with a total of 46 responding to at least some of the questions. This produced a 
response rate of 14'/0. The questions with the fewest responses received 44. 
Potential respondents were asked a series of questions, or scenarios, listed 
above, with one representing "Not Acceptable" and seven representing 
"Expected. " The results of the survey are listed below. 
1) Report items Pro Forms which are material in nature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 1 1 5 6 8 21 
2) Withhold information to increase one's own compensation through 
stock option plans 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43 2 1 0 0 0 0 
3) Report information as if the executive were a shareholder 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 3 2 7 4 6 18 
4) Report items Pro Forma in order to maximize bottom line 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33 5 4 3 1 0 0 
5) Disclose information to increase one's own compensation through 
stock option plans 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36 2 2 4 0 0 1 
6) Subtly modify information to increase stock price 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38 7 0 0 0 0 0 
7) Follow accepted but not recommended guidelines to increase net 
income 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 15 7 8 1 2 1 
8) Report items Pro Forma in order to satisfy fair bargaining conditions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 2 1 16 5 2 5 
DISCUSSION 
TELEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
First off we will address the question from a utilitarian perspective. 
Utilitarians view the moral worth of actions in terms of their consequences 
(Beauchamp and Bowie, 2001). The ethical action is the one that produces the 
greatest positive of the options, for the greatest number of people. 
The question which must next be examined, then, is this: what is the 
greatest good? The maximization of profits or stock price? Question number 
four of my survey attempts to examine this very question. The scenario "Report 
items pro forma in order to maximize bottom line" shows decidedly, that the 
predisposition in the profession towards this sort of reporting is negative. There 
is an obvious skew towards the "Not Acceptable" standard. The mean response 
on this particular question was a 1. 6, with the standard of deviation being a 1. 04. 
This low score can only indicate one thing: responding CPAs resoundingly felt 
that this practice was not acceptable! So what is the acceptable measure of 
good then? 
I argue that in this study, the greatest good is achieved by meeting the 
objectives of financial reporting as laid out in the FASB Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1. Utilitarian theory asserts that society ought to 
always produce the greatest balance of positive and the least balance of 
negative. According to Beauchamp and Bowie (2001), the means to this 
maximization is efficiency. This is exactly what is achieved when adhering to the 
FASB's objectives: efficiency within the reporting process, and an efficient, 
decipherable financial document. Efficiency is not however a good in and of 
itself. It is simply a means to a good. What is this ultimate good that we seek 
therefore? It is the objective of accounting: to provide information that will be 
useful to investors, creditors, shareholders, management, and others about the 
amounts, timing and uncertainties of future cash flows (FASB, 1978). To 
achieve this objective, the greater good, we must be certain of the 
characteristics of the information reported. 
There are certain characteristics of useful accounting information which 
the FASB defines in Statement of Accounting Concepts No. 2. These are 
understandability, comparability and consistency, relevance (including 
timeliness, predictive value and feedback value), reliability (including verifiability, 
neutrality, and representational faithfulness) and materiality (FASB 1980). We 
will take each applicable characteristic in its turn. 
First I examine relevance. In SFAC No. 2, the FASB defines relevance in 
financial reporting as the ability to make a difference in a decision (FASB 1980). 
This fits in with Mills theory in that making a difference in decision making is 
contributing to the greater good of providing useful documents. However, there 
are several criteria of the intrinsic value method which violate relevance. In 
SFAC No. 2 the FASB states that information is relevant to a situation if it can 
reduce uncertainty about the situation (FASB 1980). Under the intrinsic value 
method, compensation expense is the difference between market value at grant 
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date and exercise value at grant date, if any. Sometimes there is a difference, 
and sometimes not. This greatly reduces the predictive value of the statement in 
that potential investors can never know if there will be a substantial charge to 
earnings in a given period or not, because that depends solely on the choice of 
exercise price. The fair value method however, produces earnings charges 
more consistent from period to period, if not solely for the purpose that these 
charges exist. This valuable earnings management tool can make the timing 
and amount of future cash flows very uncertain indeed. 
Further, intrinsic value reporting lacks feedback value, as the potential 
investor can hardly view present performance in light of past performance if 
charges can be manufactured in such a way. The sixth scenario posed to 
respondents attempted to test the professional climate towards earnings 
management. The question, while admittedly simple, spoke loudly that the 
profession is strongly opposed to this practice. In fact, with a mean of 1. 2 and a 
standard of deviation of 0. 36, almost no conclusion can be made that this 
practice is acceptable. Why then is it practiced in the intrinsic value method of 
reporting? 
Next we examine comparability and consistency. Information "gains great 
usefulness if it can be compared with similar information about other enterprises 
and with similar information about the same enterprise for some other period or 
some other point in time" (FASB 1980). It is hard indeed to compare two 
companies if they choose to different avenues for intrinsic valuation. If company 
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A chooses to issue at market price, while company B chooses to issue $30 
below market price, company B will have a significant and most likely material 
non-cash charge to earnings that A so luckily avoids. This makes information 
about future cash flows very uncertain when dealing between two companies. 
The same can be said within the same organization for two different periods. 
However, the fair value method provides much information in this regard. First 
of all, this method allows users to compare the value of the compensation 
executives are receiving on a dollar for dollar basis. Secondly, very educated 
users, who understand option pricing models, can ascertain a great deal of 
information concerning the entity's position relative to other entities' based on 
the value assigned to the options, including expected future performance. 
The last applicable characteristic is materiality. Again in SFAC No. 2, the 
FASB defines material judgments as, "primarily quantitative in nature. To pose 
the question: Is this item large enough for users of the information to be 
influenced by it" (FASB 1980)? The question that is posed then is one of 
quantity. Is the difference between compensation expense using the intrinsic 
value versus the fair value material? That is, will using these two different 
methods of calculating expense produce different decisions by users? I argue 
yes. Studies have shown that this expense can be in the millions of dollars. 
Finally, from a teleological perspective, we consider the matching 
concept. This concept originated in FASB SFAC No. 3 (1980) and was further 
modified in SFAC No. 6 (1985). The idea behind the concept is that expenses 
should be matched to the period of business for which the revenue occurred that 
generated said expense. Thus again we are presented with a problem. If 
revenue is generated by the contributions of an executive then a fair and 
equitable expense should be recognized in the same period as well. In fact 
studies have shown that company profits can be largely influenced by 
executives. Many have argued executive pay to be excessive on the grounds 
that it is not in line with the relative contribution of the executive. But as Donald 
Nichols and Chandra Subramaniam (2001) point out the responsibility and 
complexity of executive jobs far outweigh those of the average worker. 
Furthermore, changing conditions and increasingly difficult challenges arise daily 
in the office of chief executive officer (Nichols and Subramaniam, 2001) They 
go on to argue that if relative compensation were granted, the appropriate 
compensation would not be immediately evident. However, this does not lead to 
the conclusion that this larger compensatory amount should not be matched to 
its corresponding revenues and deducted accordingly, while the relatively 
smaller amount of the average worker is matched and deducted in full. But 
some may argue that if there is no expense, as required by the code for intrinsic 
value reporting, then no matching need occur. I however, do not consider no 
expense a fair and equitable expense. 
DEONTOLOGICA L PERSPEC TI VES 
For this section I will largely rely on the results of the survey that was 
distributed. The first question we will examine is that of motive. Kant thought 
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this was extremely important. In fact, the entire deontological system relies 
upon motive. That is to say deontologists consider things to be ethical right if 
they are fulfilled according to your duty, not because the deed involved some 
sense of personal gain or internal satisfaction, but because it was an entity's 
duty to act accordingly (Beauchamp and Bowie, 2001). 
The first area examined will be disclosure. The question within the survey 
concerning disclosure were posed generally, but were designed to be applied 
specifically to this study. So the question I am asking becomes: was information 
disclosed, in this case compensation expense, because it was dutiful to disclose 
this information, or because the reporting entity stood to gain from the specific 
disclosure or withholding of compensation expense? 
Scenadios number two and five were presented in order to attempt to 
determine the motivation behind reporting. Was it because an executive stood 
to gain from withholding or disclosure? Or because duty required reporting the 
way it was done? With regards to withholding information, respondents felt 
overwhelmingly that this was "Not Acceptable. " In fact, this scenario received 
the lowest standard of deviation, at 0. 35, while the mean response was 1. 1. 
Clearly, the standard "withholding information for one's own gain is wrong" exists 
within the profession. On the flip side of the question, whether or not disclosure 
for one's own gain is acceptable, respondents were not as certain, but still 
heavily leaning towards "Not Acceptable. " in fact, the mean response in this 
scenario was 1. 5, while the standard of deviation was 1. 24. While this is not as 
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significant, I believe that it still points towards an established standard within the 
profession that "disclosure for one's own gain is wrong. " Coupled together, 
these point to one significant reason for reporting information: duty. So the next 
logical question becomes: what is it our duty to reports Question number seven 
attempts to establish this and does so reasonably well. A mean response of 2. 6 
and a standard deviation of 1. 48 show a healthy aversion to following accepted 
but not recommended guidelines. Then logically following, our duty is to report 
by recommended guidelines. I argue that the fair value method of reporting falls 
in line with duty, while the intrinsic value method does not. 
Another deontologist, John Rawls, takes Kant's theory one step further. 
Rawls defines ethical behavior as that which it is dutiful to do under fair 
bargaining conditions (Rawls, 1971). These are defined as conditions that a free 
and rational person concerned to further their own interests would accept in an 
initial position of equity. 
The first stone in building this argument is establishing the applicability of 
fair bargaining conditions. The scenario posed was whether or not executives 
are expected to report items as if the executive were a shareholder. This 
question's responses were the least notable, with a mean response of 5. 1 and a 
standard of deviation of 2. 04. While not proof of an industry standard, this does 
lead to the conclusion that it is between expected and acceptable to report 
information with this mindset. While not expected, I will call this practice 
appropriate, which leads to the conclusion that the fair bargaining constraints are 
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the duty of the executive. In this area, accountants surveyed generally felt that it 
was between "Acceptable" and "Not Acceptable" to report pro forma items to 
satisfy fair bargaining conditions. The mean response to the scenario was a 3. 5 
and the standard of deviation a 1. 99. While not staggering, I will call this "Not 
appropriate. " 
The relevance of this is becomes apparent when considering the rules of 
intrinsic value reporting. This method requires the expense which would have 
been incurred under the fair value method to be disclosed pro forma, with the 
effect on earnings included. Logically then, the reason to value stock options 
using the intrinsic value method is to maximize the bottom line seen by users. 
After all, if reported in the notes, the information is accessible, but reporting 
entities wish to convey a different figure that the one obtained under the fair 
value method. 
Accountants did not however, feel that reporting items as pro forma in 
order to maximize the bottom line was acceptable. The mean response when 
presented with this scenario was 1. 6 while the standard of deviation was 1. 04. 
As discussed earlier, this leads to the conclusion that this practice is 
unacceptable. Which leads me to the following conclusions: although 
acceptable, reporting compensation expense pro forma (i. e. intrinsic value 
method) is done in order to maximize the bottom number seen by most users. 
This however does not satisfy the fair bargaining requirements, established as 
the duty of the executive, and is therefore unethical. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
While an entirely theoretical discussion of ethical behavior is fine, little 
can be done if the profession does not try to adhere with the standards 
apparently already present. According to Alan Lovell, "human behavior is a 
function of many influences, and the transition from moral reasoning to moral 
behavior is both tenuous and troublesome (Lovell, 1995). What then is the next 
step? The next step is for the accounting profession to take responsibility for the 
standards intrinsic to its members, and for the FASB to take a stand on the 
issues it feels are pertinent. Nothing can be done until this occurs. 
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